By Peter Ungphakorn
POSTED AUGUST 4, 2020 | UPDATED MAY 3, 2022
On August 3, 2020, a group of 50 World Trade Organization members — 30% of the membership — announced that an alternative arrangement was up and running, as a means of getting round a blockage preventing formal appeals in WTO dispute settlement.
Developed gradually since early 2019, the system would retain countries’ ability to get a second opinion after a first-stage “panel” ruling, but unlike a formal appeal, the outcome would not be part of official WTO law.
Twenty-five years ago in 1995, the new ability to appeal an initial ruling was one of several acclaimed changes in dispute settlement, introduced when the World Trade Organization was created to take over the multilateral trading system from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
(Another was the change to the consensus rule. Under GATT, rulings could only be adopted by consensus of the membership, allowing a “losing” country to block a ruling. Now they could only be rejected by consensus.)
The US was one of the driving forces behind those reforms. But more recently it has objected to how appeals are handled and has blocked the appointment or reappointment of Appellate Body judges.
As their terms expired the judges dwindled from seven to only one left in position from December 2019 — two short of the minimum of three needed to hear an appeal — and since November 30, 2020, none. The Appellate Body can no longer function. Worse, some first-stage panel reports have deliberately been appealed “into the void” so that they cannot proceed. (More on this here.)
The stop-gap alternative would be by voluntary arbitration under Article 25 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, the WTO agreement governing legal disputes. It will only be used until the Appellate Body can resume.
SEE ALSO The Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) page on Geneva Trade Platform’s WTO Plurilaterals website
Arbitration features regularly in WTO disputes, particularly to determine whether proposed retaliation over failure to comply with a ruling is excessive. This would be the first time it has been used to appeal panel rulings.
The system is “voluntary” because the countries involved choose to participate and to comply with the outcome. Its official name is the Multi-party Interim Appeal Arrangement (MPIA). For normal appeals, compliance is an obligation.
The final step in setting up the system was to create a pool of 10 arbitrators. The group announced on July 31, 2020, that the 10 arbitrators had been appointed (see this announcement from the EU and this from Canada).
On January 24, 2020, first moves were announced to turn this from the bilateral agreements into a group arrangement as a number of other countries joined in. This became a fully-developed text shared with the WTO membership on April 30, 2020.
On August 3, 2020 the list of arbitrators was announced, when the group had grown to 5o WTO members (counting the EU as 28). Macao signed up on September 22, 2020:
Australia, Benin, Brazil, Canada, China, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, the EU and its 27 member states, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Iceland, Macao, Mexico, Montenegro, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Singapore, Switzerland, Ukraine, and Uruguay (total 51).
But between January and August, two countries had dropped out: S.Korea and Panama.
Also notably absent are the US, Japan and UK, along with Argentina, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and others.
THE TEN ARBITRATORS
Announced on August 3, 2020:
1. Mateo Diego-Fernández ANDRADE (Mexico)
2. Thomas COTTIER (Switzerland)
3. Locknie HSU (Singapore)
4. Valerie HUGHES (Canada)
5. Alejandro JARA (Chile)
6. José Alfredo Graça LIMA (Brazil)
7. Claudia OROZCO (Colombia)
8. Joost PAUWELYN (EU/Belgium)
9. Penelope RIDINGS (New Zealand)
10. Guohua YANG (China)
The stop-gap appeals would be heard by three out of a pool of 10 standing appeal arbitrators (and not former Appellate Body judges as in the earlier Canada-EU — see this news story — and Norway-EU agreements). The three would be chosen according to the same principles as for the full Appellate Body.
“This is a slate of very talented, professional, experienced women and men,” tweeted Jennifer Hillman, a former Appellate Body judge.
“They may be able to show the world how to do appeals in state-to-state disputes without running into the problems the WTO Appellate Body encountered.”
But a number of issues remain unresolved, where administrative and legal support would come from and who would pay for it.
What the procedure does says the support “will be entirely separate from” the WTO Secretariat. Would it include seconding WTO Secretariat staff? Would the support come from some or all of the countries participating in the system? Who would pay for it? So far, those questions are unanswered, but the WTO Director-General is supposed to play a role:
7. The participating Members envisage that appeal arbitrators will be provided with appropriate administrative and legal support, which will offer the necessary guarantees of quality and independence, given the nature of the responsibilities involved. The participating Members envisage that the support structure will be entirely separate from the WTO Secretariat staff and its divisions supporting the panels and be answerable, regarding the substance of their work, only to appeal arbitrators. The participating Members request the WTO Director General to ensure the availability of a support structure meeting these criteria.
This patch would also seem to have an important legal difference compared with a normal appeal. The result of the arbitration would not be adopted by the WTO membership (in the Dispute Settlement Body). It would simply be notified to them as required by Article 25 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.
Therefore it’s unlikely it would be seen as an official interpretation or clarification of WTO law and could not be cited as a precedent in future cases. (This and other legal implications — including whether retaliation would be possible if a country failed to comply with an arbitration ruling — are discussed in this article, and many others found here.)
The idea of using arbitration as a way of getting round the Appellate Body blockage has been around for some time. Among advocates are a group of lawyers affiliated with Sidley Austin LLP, some formerly at the WTO (2017), Jens Hillebrand Pohl of Maastricht University (September 2017) and former Appellate Body judge James Bacchus (October 2018).
It remains to be seen whether more countries join the group, and how the move is put into practice.
Turkey is not part of this multi-party group, but in early 2022, the EU and Turkey agreed bilaterally to use appeal-by-arbitration as a means of double-checking a panel ruling.
Details of the EU-Turkey system, the first appealed case, how the bilateral procedure compares with the multi-party version, and the first appealed case, are here.
This article was originally part of a longer piece on the problems in the WTO’s Appellate Body, which includes a reading list here. The Multi-party Interim Appeal Arrangement is listed among 18 “plurilaterals” in the WTO.
May 3, 2022 — adding details on administrative and legal support. (April 29, 2022 — adding the EU-Turkey appeal-by-arbitration, now moved to a new blog post.)
January 29, 2021 — adding links to articles on the International Economic Law and Policy blog, and to a reading list and a piece on plurilaterals on this blog.
February 13, 2020 — adding “appeal into the void” and update to reflect no Appellate Body judges left
September 23, 2020 — adding Macao to the participants list
Credits: Photos CC0