WTO agriculture negotiators face challenge of thinking outside the box(es)

Monday’s retreat is an attempt to produce fresh thinking that might break the deadlock in the two remaining pillars.

By Peter Ungphakorn
POSTED OCTOBER 23, 2022 | UPDATED OCTOBER 24, 2022

See also the report on the retreat (published October 26, 2022):
WTO agriculture retreat said strong on context but weak on give-and-take

Brain-storming. Blue sky thinking. Wiping the slate clean. Thinking outside the box. Pick your cliché. World Trade Organization (WTO) members’ ambassadors and agriculture attachés go on a “retreat” tomorrow (October 24) as they try to discover solutions where none have been found for over a decade.

The common impression is that the WTO agriculture negotiations have achieved nothing since they started almost a quarter of a century ago in 2000.

This is partly because after just over a year (in 2001), the talks were rolled into the newly launched and broader Doha Round of WTO negotiations. And now the Doha Round is widely considered to be dead.

Officially the position is more complicated. Some members say the Doha Round is over. Others say the original mandate continues — they refuse to endorse the end of the round.

In practice some parts of the Doha Round have been concluded, such as the Trade Facilitation and Fisheries Subsidies agreements. Other parts are in limbo or the talks have dried up, at least among the full membership. What has faded away is the idea of the talks as one unified package or “single undertaking”.

(An aside here. What almost no one has noticed is that the Trade Negotiations Committee of the WTO membership — with the director-general ex officio in the chair — still meets. This committee was set up specifically within the Doha Round. If the round has ended so should the Trade Negotiations Committee. That would also mean the director-general has no official position in any council or committee of the WTO membership.)

Continue reading “WTO agriculture negotiators face challenge of thinking outside the box(es)”

Milestone or inchpebble? The first UK ‘trade deal’ with a US state, Indiana

It’s a non-binding memorandum of understanding and Indiana itself could hardly be less interested

By Peter Ungphakorn
POSTED MAY 29, 2022 | UPDATED MAY 31, 2022

“They said a US trade deal couldn’t be done. It can. We are doing it.”

That declaration by UK Minister of State for Trade Policy Penny Mordaunt is the headline on a piece she wrote on a partisan website to celebrate signing an agreement with the US state, Indiana.

But is it a “US trade deal”?

  • It is not with the “US”, but Indiana — a state with 2% of the US population (at 6 million slightly more than Yorkshire or Scotland), less than 2% of the US economy (GDP), and less than 1% of its area (ranked 38th of the 50 US states)
  • The actual “trade” content is minimal, when compared with what governments usually sign in trade agreements
  • “Deal” is misleading since this is not the conclusion of anything. It’s a memorandum of understanding (MoU) — or joint statement of intent — on future cooperation and on what future talks will cover. The way it’s presented stretches the meaning of “agreement” a lot.

The phrase “trade deal” is itself a problem.

Continue reading “Milestone or inchpebble? The first UK ‘trade deal’ with a US state, Indiana”

Down a rabbit hole in search of the Wensleydale deal with Norway

Transparency doesn’t just mean making information available. It means making it accessible and understandable

Rabbit hole noun

A complexly bizarre or difficult state or situation conceived of as a hole into which one falls or descends
I wanted to show this woman descending into the rabbit hole: this loss of self, becoming a servant to her job and to the work — Jessica Chastain

Especially : One in which the pursuit of something (such as an answer or solution) leads to other questions, problems, or pursuits
— While trying to find the picture again on Google, I fell down the Cosmo rabbit hole, scrolling through a gallery of swimwear, then through “How to Be Sexier-Instantly” and then through all 23 slides of “Sexy Ideas for Long Hair.” — Edith Zimmerman

Merriam Webster Dictionary online

By Peter Ungphakorn
POSTED JUNE 8, 2021 | UPDATED JUNE 9, 2021

This is a cautionary tale about just how difficult it is to crack the secret codes of trade agreements. We can ask a simple question: how will the agreement change trade in a particular product. To reach the answer we often have to venture out into a wonderland of obscure paths and hidden traps.

Does it matter? Yes, if we want to find out for ourselves what is in the agreement. Bob Wolfe and I have argued at length about the need for more transparency in trade. This is true of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which is part of the rabbit warren. It is also true of free trade agreements.

Transparency doesn’t just mean making information available. It means making it accessible and understandable. Tracking down tariff commitments can be a nightmare, as this story shows.

Continue reading “Down a rabbit hole in search of the Wensleydale deal with Norway”

Summary: ‘WTO terms’ apply in any future UK-EU trade relationship. But how much?

A lot has been said about Britain trading with the EU on ‘WTO terms’. But a fundamental misunderstanding needs to be cleared up. It’s not just about ‘no deal’.

This is a summary of a 3-part article looking at the meaning of “WTO terms” for UK-EU trade in goods, services and more.
The main article is here
.
The series draws partly on a paper from The UK in a Changing Europe

By Peter Ungphakorn
POSTED MAY 27, 2020 | UPDATED MAY 27, 2020

Now that UK-EU trade talks have begun, it’s important to recognise that “WTO terms” will unavoidably apply to the trading relationship — whether or not there’s a deal. It isn’t either/or. It isn’t either a deal or “WTO”, as some people describe it. It’s a question of scale.

The point is: the more the UK and EU trade on WTO terms, the more trade barriers they raise against each other — from a starting position where trade between them has fewer international trade barriers than anywhere else in the world outside the EU.

Continue reading “Summary: ‘WTO terms’ apply in any future UK-EU trade relationship. But how much?”

‘WTO terms’ apply in any future UK-EU trade relationship. But how much? Part 1 ‘WTO terms’

A lot has been said about Britain trading with the EU on ‘WTO terms’. But a fundamental misunderstanding needs to be cleared up. It’s not just about ‘no deal’. Part 1 of 3

By Peter Ungphakorn
POSTED MAY 27, 2020 | UPDATED MAY 27, 2020

This first of 3 parts looks at the meaning of “WTO terms” for UK-EU trade. Part 2 is on goods trade. Part 3 is on services, intellectual property and other issues.
A short summary is here
.
They draw partly on a paper from The UK in a Changing Europe

Now that UK-EU trade talks have begun, it’s important to recognise that “WTO terms” will unavoidably apply to the trading relationship — whether or not there’s a deal. It isn’t either/or. It isn’t either a deal or “WTO”, as some people describe it. It’s a question of scale

And that scale determines how many trade barriers go up on trade between the UK and EU — from a starting position where their trading relationship is one of the freest in the world.

Continue reading “‘WTO terms’ apply in any future UK-EU trade relationship. But how much? Part 1 ‘WTO terms’”

‘WTO terms’ apply in any future UK-EU trade relationship. But how much? Part 3 services and more

A lot has been said about Britain trading with the EU on ‘WTO terms’. But a fundamental misunderstanding needs to be cleared up. It’s not just about ‘no deal’. Part 3 of 3

This final of 3 parts looks at UK-EU trade in services
and other issues under “WTO terms”.
Part 1 is on the meaning of “WTO terms”. Part 2 is on goods trade.
A short summary is here
.
They draw partly on a paper from The UK in a Changing Europe

By Peter Ungphakorn
POSTED MAY 27, 2020 | UPDATED MAY 27, 2020

As with goods, if the UK and EU fail to reach agreement, or if the agreement has limited content, UK-EU trade will see new trade barriers in services. Also possible are complications in intellectual property and dispute settlement among other issues.

Continue reading “‘WTO terms’ apply in any future UK-EU trade relationship. But how much? Part 3 services and more”

‘WTO terms’ apply in any future UK-EU trade relationship. But how much? Part 2 Goods

A lot has been said about Britain trading with the EU on ‘WTO terms’. But a fundamental misunderstanding needs to be cleared up. It’s not just about ‘no deal’. Part 2 of 3

This second of 3 parts looks at UK-EU trade in goods under “WTO terms”. Part 1 is on the meaning of ‘WTO terms’. Part 3 is on services, intellectual property and other issues.
A short summary is here
.
They draw partly on a paper from The UK in a Changing Europe

By Peter Ungphakorn
POSTED MAY 27, 2020 | UPDATED MAY 27, 2020

If the UK and EU fail to reach agreement, British goods imports from the EU and its exports to the EU will face tariffs and non-tariff barriers. That is not just the result of trading solely on WTO terms. Even with an agreement, some aspects of goods trade will still face the new barriers of trading on WTO terms.

Continue reading “‘WTO terms’ apply in any future UK-EU trade relationship. But how much? Part 2 Goods”

Spot the difference: US tariffs on Scotch are not part of a tariff war

BBC Question Time was wrong about tariffs. It matters.

By Peter Ungphakorn
FROM UK TRADE FORUM, JANUARY 24, 2020 | UPDATED DECEMBER 9 2020

On January 23, 2020, Fiona Bruce, the host of Question Time on BBC TV, repeatedly and wrongly confused US tariffs on Scotch whisky with the US threat to raise tariffs on cars if Britain taxes digital technology companies.

The mistake matters because UK-US trade talks are likely to feature regularly over the coming months, not least on Question Time.

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Opinion: Brexit challenges the meaning of ‘political’ reporting

The problem isn’t just about quoting unnamed sources. It’s about what’s reported in the name of ‘politics’

By Peter Ungphakorn
POSTED OCTOBER 27, 2019 | UPDATED OCTOBER 29, 2019

Some hard-hitting comment has been written recently about the dangers of using of unnamed sources in reporting about Brexit. Less attention has been paid to how the main broadcasters put different aspects of Brexit into separate reporting categories — particularly “politics” — and how this affects the debate.

The two issues are linked, though. The priority given to what the “sources” say colours the meaning of “political” reporting too. Journalists compete to get the scoop instead of providing the most informative coverage. They are not the same.

Continue reading “Opinion: Brexit challenges the meaning of ‘political’ reporting”

Iain Duncan Smith & co are wrong about GATT Art24, Brexit and getting out of jail

Tory Brexiteers’ claim that WTO rules let them pull a rabbit out of the hat is pure magical thinking

By Peter Ungphakorn
POSTED SEPTEMBER 5, 2019 | UPDATED SEPTEMBER 5, 2019
ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED ON THE TELEGRAPH WEBSITE, SEPTEMBER 2, 2019

Does the World Trade Organization (WTO) have a magic legal provision, one that Britain can use to get out of the “no-deal” Brexit jail?

No, and this has been pointed out repeatedly. And yet Iain Duncan Smith, David Campbell Bannerman and co, still think it does, judging by their piece for the Telegraph on August 30, 2019.

They are wrong because they misunderstand the provision they cite: Article 24 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). They are wrong because they overlook the realities of what it means.

Continue reading “Iain Duncan Smith & co are wrong about GATT Art24, Brexit and getting out of jail”