Why it’s a mistake to talk about a ‘Swiss-style’ post-Brexit UK-EU deal

By Peter Ungphakorn
POSTED NOVEMBER 21, 2022 | UPDATED DECEMBER 5, 2022

Maybe it was because someone thought it would be a good idea to stick a label on where UK-EU relations might be heading now that the atmosphere between the two is widely reported to have improved. Or perhaps it was just because people were bored while waiting for the football World Cup to start.

Whatever the reason, “Swiss-style ties with Brussels” suddenly became big news over the weekend after the Sunday Times reported (November 20, 2022, paywalled, but some more detail here) that the British government is considering exactly that.

Reactions ranged from “Doubt it. EU hates its relationship with Switzerland & Switzerland hates its relationship with EU” (Mujtaba Rahman, here), to “when someone says ‘Swiss-style’ relationship, rather than hearing ‘a slightly better relationship [than] now’ everyone is like ‘LET ME GET MY NOTES’” (Sam Lowe, here).

The problem here is that “Swiss-style” is being used as shorthand. It’s a label, but one that’s misleading and not really explained. Both of the reactions above are valid, at least to some extent, but they are talking about different things.

Milestone or inchpebble? The first UK ‘trade deal’ with a US state, Indiana

By Peter Ungphakorn
POSTED MAY 29, 2022 | UPDATED MAY 31, 2022

“They said a US trade deal couldn’t be done. It can. We are doing it.”

That declaration by UK Minister of State for Trade Policy Penny Mordaunt is the headline on a piece she wrote on a partisan website to celebrate signing an agreement with the US state, Indiana.

But is it a “US trade deal”?

• It is not with the “US”, but Indiana — a state with 2% of the US population (at 6 million slightly more than Yorkshire or Scotland), less than 2% of the US economy (GDP), and less than 1% of its area (ranked 38th of the 50 US states)
• The actual “trade” content is minimal, when compared with what governments usually sign in trade agreements
• “Deal” is misleading since this is not the conclusion of anything. It’s a memorandum of understanding (MoU) — or joint statement of intent — on future cooperation and on what future talks will cover. The way it’s presented stretches the meaning of “agreement” a lot.

The phrase “trade deal” is itself a problem.

With little fanfare, the US splits its tariff quotas for UK and EU exports

By Peter Ungphakorn
POSTED JULY 5, 2021 | UPDATED JULY 5, 2021

On the eve of the July 4 holiday, the United States announced new tariff quotas for some dairy products and tobacco imported from Britain and the European Union, from 2022.

This is the other side of the coin for an issue that has received much more attention — how the tariff quotas for imports into the original EU28 are being split between the post-Brexit EU27 and the UK, the on-going discussion in the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the resolution with some of the objecting countries.

Presumably Britain and the EU have accepted these new conditions on their exports.

UK-Australia trade deal: when a cap on farm goods is not a cap

By Peter Ungphakorn
POSTED JUNE 18, 2021 | UPDATED JUNE 2, 2023

“British farmers will be protected by a cap on tariff-free imports for 15 years, using tariff rate quotas and other safeguards,” declared the UK International Trade Department on June 15, 2021.

But will they, though? The text of the agreement-in-principle between Britain and Australia was published a few days later, also in several formats on the Australian government website.

It was not a final deal. That was eventually signed six months later, on December 16, 2021. It took effect on May 31, 2023.

Much of the June agreement-in-principle was in the future tense — agreement between the two “will include” this that and the other. Negotiations continued.

A note at the end of the text, which the Australian government called a “disclaimer”, said:

“DISCLAIMER: This document reflects what the UK and Australian FTA [free trade agreement] negotiating teams have jointly decided as of 16 June 2021 should be included in the FTA once it is finalised. It does not prejudge the outcome of the FTA negotiations or any further proposals for FTA commitments either the UK or Australia may make after this date. It is also not intended to create any treaty obligations.”

But the agreement-in-principle did show some of what is intended for agricultural products.

The reason it was announced on June 15 is because British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and his Australian counterpart Scott Morrison wanted a fanfare for their post-G7 meeting, even if the negotiations were incomplete.

Two years later when the agreement came into force, Politico published this account of what happened at the Johnson-Morrison dinner before the announcement in 2021.

The UK’s rolled-over deals after the Brexit transition

UPDATE: On January 25, 2024, talks between Canada and the UK broke down — paused by the UK — over issues such as Canadian tariff quotas for UK cheese, rules of origin for UK cars post-Brexit (affecting duty-free rights) and sanitary conditions for Canadian beef in the UK (not about hormones as in some reports but “about carcass washes used in Canadian processing facilities” according to Janyce McGregor of CBC.

The result was that the Canada-UK deal was an incomplete “roll-over” of the Canada-EU trade agreement. See “UK walks away from trade talks with Canada” (CBC)

By Peter Ungphakorn
POSTED JANUARY 1, 2021 | UPDATED JANUARY 26, 2024

On January 1, 2021, Britain left the EU Single Market and customs union. That meant the EU’s free trade agreements with non-EU countries no longer applied to the UK.

The British government has negotiated, at speed, “roll-over” agreements with those non-EU countries in order to reproduce the effects of those agreements as much as possible so that continuity is maximised for UK business.

This article does not look at the contents or depth of the deals. It simply counts how many of the EU’s free trade agreements have been “rolled over” into continuity agreements with the UK, and how many have not been done.

‘No deal’ on UK-EU trade is worse than ‘Australia-style’

By Peter Ungphakorn
POSTED NOVEMBER 30, 2020 | UPDATED DECEMBER 1, 2020

As the risk of failure in the UK- EU talks on their future relationship increases towards the end of the Brexit transition, the British government is trying to disguise “no deal” as if it were some kind of deal.

What Brexiters used to call a “WTO deal”, is now “An Australia-type relationship” in coordinated messaging from Prime Minister Boris Johnson, his Cabinet, and his supporters in Parliament. Among the latest is Environment and Farming Secretary George Eustice. He of all people should know better.

FACT CHECK: Which UK geographical indications are in its trade deal with Japan?

By Peter Ungphakorn
POSTED OCTOBER 26, 2020 | UPDATED SEPTEMBER 27, 2022

UPDATE a year later: So far no new British geographical indications have been registered in Japan. But the EU has secured protection (officially “designated” geographical indications) for 21 new food names since February 1, 2021 — items 75–95 on this list (with 17 more apparently pending comment on this list). And according to the US Department of Agriculture, three new spirits and four new wines were also registered, although they are not yet listed in English on the official Japanese website.

The UK International Trade Department said on October 22, 2021 that discussions with Japan on protecting new names started early in the year. The UK shared its list with Japan on April 30. These British geographical indications “will now go through Japan’s procedures as quickly as possible,” the department said.

More on Japanese lists of registered names can be found below.

_________

TWO YEARS LATER: Still no new UK geographical indications registered in Japan. The number of the EU’s added names has increased by the previously-pending 17 to reach 38.

Ben Ramanauskas, a former adviser to Liz Truss and the UK International Trade Department, wrote this explanation on November 27, 2022:

“… After the negotiations were finalised I was tasked by Liz Truss (possibly as a punishment) to work on ensuring that the new Geographical Indications (GIs) were recognised by the Japanese Government. GIs essentially mean that certain UK products receive protected status in another country, so that there would be no imitation[*] Cheddar Cheese or Cornish Pasties being produced in Tokyo or Kyoto. This is all well and good, but could hardly be considered a priority given how economically insignificant many of the industries set to benefit are. The politics of it all matters unfortunately, and it makes for nice headlines especially if accompanied with a photo next to some flags.”

* Note “imitation” is not correct here. For protected geographical indications, imitation is allowed. Using the same name is not.

_________

THREE YEARS LATER: Still no new UK geographical indications registered in Japan (see The Guardian, May 21, 2023). Meanwhile, on September 27, 2023 the EU announced another list of protected names under its agreement with Japan, 42 altogether, about 30 of them EU names.

_________

The moral of this fable (as if we didn’t know already): Don’t count those Orpington chickens before they hatch. Don’t believe promises of a future agreement, or future deals under an existing agreement until they are delivered.

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Britain’s new trade agreement with Japan contains some improvements over the EU-Japan deal it rolls over, but some of London’s claims don’t stand up to scrutiny.

“It’s a roll-over of the EU deal with extra bits. And that’s a success too. That’s still better than we thought we’re going to get. Why not just say that?” tweeted trade advisor Anna Jerzewska.

She was commenting on the claim by International Trade Secretary Liz Truss that this “first trade agreement” for Britain “as an independent trading nation” has “major wins that would be impossible as part of the EU.”

Text of the UK-Japan trade deal: user-friendly download links

By Peter Ungphakorn
POSTED OCTOBER 24, 2020 | UPDATED JANUARY 25, 2021

The UK-Japan free trade agreement was signed in Tokyo on October 23, 2020. This page provides user-friendly links to download different chapters and annexes of the entire agreement.

Why do this? On the UK government’s website, the files are sub-divided somewhat arbitrarily — in particular the long files of goods schedules are split at arbitrary places, making it difficult to identify what each file contains.

The files linked here were taken from that website (on October 24, 2020), then redivided and in some cases recombined into chapters and annexes, and labelled accordingly.

This should also help in comparing the agreement, chapter by chapter, with the EU-Japan agreement (full details here).

Four years on, still basic mistakes on tariffs at the very top of UK politics

By Peter Ungphakorn
POSTED SEPTEMBER 18, 2020 | UPDATED SEPTEMBER 22, 2020

Here we go again. You’d have thought they would get it right by now. After all it’s over four years since the Brexit referendum thrust trade and World Trade Organization (WTO) rules into the British political consciousness.

And yet, there we were, on September 16, 2020, a few weeks before a UK-EU trade agreement was supposed to be concluded, listening to two leading politicians showing they still don’t get the most basic rule in international trade.

Will ‘Melton Mowbray’ stay protected in the EU after the Brexit transition?

By Peter Ungphakorn
POSTED AUGUST 29, 2020 | UPDATED JANUARY 10, 2021

News that Britain wanted to renegotiate a deal struck in the Brexit Withdrawal Agreement on geographical indications — names such as Scotch whisky, Melton Mowbray pies, Cognac and Roquefort cheese — has triggered a discussion about what exactly was agreed, what wasn’t included and why not.

A report in The Guardian (echoing some earler reports) said the EU was “flabbergasted” that the UK wanted to water down the deal on geographical indications. “It’s just not going to happen,” the report quoted an EU official as saying.