This technical note accompanies
Cairns Group circulates ambitious WTO plan for reforming farm support and
India ramps up rhetoric on farm support before major WTO meeting
See also
The Cairns Group’s Analysis of Trends in Green Box Support (December 21, 2023)
Revision: The group issued a revision on January 12, 2024, adding Ukraine as a new sponsor. The rest of the proposal is unchanged except some new links to documents
By Peter Ungphakorn
NOVEMBER 4, 2023 | UPDATED JANUARY 17, 2024
On November 2, 2023, the Cairns Group circulated a proposal on negotiating cuts in domestic farm support. The purpose is to adopt an approach for the whole of domestic support, one of the three “pillars” covered by the World Trade Organization’s Agriculture Agreement — the other two are market access and export competition. The text is below.
The Cairns Group’s members are successful agricultural exporters. They generally favour liberalising agricultural trade and are against keeping high levels of protection and subsidy, although its members vary in their commitment to those objectives.
The proposal is drafted as a decision for the next WTO Ministerial Conference in Abu Dhabi, February 26–29, 2024. It is ambitious and is unlikely to receive consensus support by February. Whether agreement on it can be reached at all, even after negotiated changes, remains to be seen.
Its focus is on lowering the ceilings (reducing the “entitlements”) for each WTO member. This will impact countries whose present domestic support for agriculture is close to their limits but not those who have already cut their actual subsidies to much lower levels.
The proposal has an additional target: to halve global domestic farm support.
The group also sees the proposal as a way to settle the question of subsidies used to procure food security stocks in developing countries after years, if not decades, of deadlock. The proposed solution in the new paper is in the reconfigured limits on trade-distorting domestic support per product (“product-specific AMS limits”).
The final paragraph proposes that the text becomes the permanent solution, replacing the present interim solution.
Only 14 of the Cairns Group’s members are sponsoring the paper — Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, Peru, Thailand, Uruguay and Vietnam.
Of the five remaining members, Guatemala, Indonesia, Pakistan and the Philippines are also members of the G33 group, which takes an opposing view on using subsidies to buy food into security stocks. The fifth, South Africa, increasingly aligns itself with India, a driving force behind the G33 position.
The above formula was applied for nine iterations
in order to obtain the results in Column 3
— footnote in Annex 1
Within a pretty complex paper are some key principles:
- Big subsidisers — principally those with a large share of entitlements among all WTO members, but with some additional details — cut their entitlements more.
- Global entitlements to be halved — the sum of all support entitlements across all WTO members would be cut by 50%.
- “Blue Box” and “Development Box” to have limits. These two types of support are currently allowed without limit. The formula brings them into a new overall entitlement envelope. The “Blue Box” is subsidies whose distortions are weakened by production limits. The “Development Box” is support allowed for developing countries without limits, for development and to help poor farmers, including input subsidies.
The table under the heading “Section C” shows that India is a large user of the Development Box, $25 billion per year according to FAO figures, while the EU and China are large users of the Blue Box.
- The smallest subsidisers are allowed upward adjustments so their final entitlements never fall below $250 million per year, $500mn or $750mn depending on how low their limit would be without the adjustment.
- For specific products, big exporters have lower entitlements; importers have larger entitlements or are exempt limits completely, depending on the significance of the imports. These entitlements are a sliding scale of percentages of the amount the country produces (the “value of production”).
- Importing countries can raise tariffs temporarily on products receiving more support than 10% of the value of production in the exporting countries, even if the entitlement is not breached — the Domestic Support Trigger Mechanism.
This new mechanism would be a defence against subsidised competition from imports, but not for competition in third markets. It’s also new to WTO agriculture rules.
A detailed explanation of the approach is in the analytical section of Costa Rica’s original version of the paper, which was removed in the revised Cairns Group version.
The cuts would be phased in by the end of 2034 (ie, in 10 years if implemented from the end of 2024, the Ministerial Conference year).
The proposal includes an additional constraint based on all entitlements added up worldwide (or rather, over the whole WTO membership).
The Cairns Group proposes halving the global total over the same period. This additional constraint is the main reason why the calculations involve running the formula through nine iterations, surely a unique level of complexity, certainly not found anywhere else in the WTO.
In its papers, Costa Rica explains how the iterations are needed to achieve that 50% global cut (from page 6 of the original JOB/AG/243 from June 2023, and from page 8 of this paper from May 2021).
Examples of the outcome for all WTO members except least-developed countries — based on hypothetical numbers (to be negotiated) and some adjustements — are in Annex 1 of the draft text.
Former US negotiator Joe Glauber points out that according to latest figures the US would have to cut the support it currently provides.
“Under the Cairns proposal, the cap on overall trade distorting support for the United States would be a hefty USD 31.183 billion., but the US would have exceeded this cap in 2019 and 2020 (due to record COVID and trade war payments),” he says.
How would this deal with the thorny question of subsidised purchases into food security stocks in developing countries (the misnamed PSH, see box)? The proposed answer lies in new entitlements for specific products.
“PSH”: A MISLEADING NAME
Subsidising purchases into food security stocks is nicknamed “public stockholding for food security in developing countries” or just “public stockholding” (PSH) for short.
The name is misleading because WTO rules do not prevent stockholding. They only discipline subsidised procurement. Even that is allowed, so long as the developing country stays within its subsidy limit, usually 10% of the value of production, which can be a large amount.
This could be described as something like “over-the-limit subsidies used to procure food security stocks”.
The practice is not widespread. A 2022 paper by a Canada-led group found tentatively that since 2013 “only five members notified expenditures […] for stocks acquired at [a supported] price at least once” and only nine since 2001.
Only one country — India — has exceeded its domestic support limit when using subsidies to buy into stocks, and for only one product: rice. For 2021–22, the fourth successive year of the breach, India’s subsidy was calculated at $7.55bn, exceeding its $5.0bn limit by 52%. (The following year the excess subsidy fell back to 20%.)
An “interim” 2013 WTO ministerial decision modified by another decision in 2014 — called a “peace clause” — has protected India from facing a legal challenge despite breaching its WTO commitment.
One problem is that the peace clause is only available to countries with “existing” programmes in December 2013. The few covered include China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines and Taiwan, according to a November 2023 WTO Secretariat summary.
The present deadlock is over an unresolved permanent solution originally intended to replace the interim one in 2017. Details are here.
(Updated April 22, 2024)
The present limit for developing countries is usually “de minimis” or 10% of the value of production. The Cairns Group proposes a sliding scale of new limits depending on whether the product is imported or exported by the country concerned and how significant the imports or exports are.
These range from total exemption, or 100% of the value of production when the country depends on imports, all the way down to 10% of the value of production (the present “de minimis”) if the country is a major exporter of that product.
In practice that would mean India — the only country to have exceeded its entitlement in this way — would continue to have a limit of 10% of the value of production because its rice exports are well over the proposed threshold of 5% of world exports.
The crucial difference would be that India would no longer be shielded from a legal challenge in WTO dispute settlement if this were to replace the present interim “peace clause”.
The paper was originally drafted by Costa Rica, which has been active in developing analysis and proposals on domestic support (see also JOB/AG/199 from May 2021).
This revision, with 13 other Cairns Group members joining Costa Rica, removes the analysis from the original paper, leaving a draft agreement called “modalities” — the methods for cutting the subsidies.
Costa Rica’s original draft is modified slightly. In particular the new proposal ditches “special countervailing measures” — the name taken from the WTO Subsidies Agreement but with different criteria — in favour of a near-identical “domestic support trigger mechanism”, with some small changes in the detail.
JARGON BUSTER
● AMS = aggregate measurement of support, measuring support that distorts prices and production
● Annex 2 of the AoA = minimally distorting support (also known as the “Green Box”)
● AoA = Agreement on Agriculture
● Art(icle) 6.2 = support allowed for developing countries without limits, for development and to help poor farmers (the “Development Box”)
● BC = base cap (starting position before cuts) ● NC = new cap (ending position after cuts)
● cap = upper limit
● DSTM = Domestic Support Trigger Mechanism (below), allows a country to raise import duty temporarily on a product, by up to 50% of the current maximum tariff for the product (the “bound rate”), if support for the product in the exporting country is more than 10% of the value of production or if the country has not yet notified that it is within the 10%
● FBTAMS = “final bound total aggregate measurement of support” = the present agreed limits on total trade-distorting domestic support for each country, after cuts made under the 1986–94 Uruguay Round agreements
● HS2017 = 2017 version of the Harmonised System for using code numbers to identify products
● LDC = least-developed country/ies
● Special session = negotiations
● VoP = value of production
● […] (square brackets) = suggested numbers or text, to be negotiated — although the whole draft would also be open to negotiation
CONTENTS
TOWARDS A STRENGTHENED NEGOTIATION FRAMEWORK IN THE DOMESTIC SUPPORT PILLAR: BUILDING A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS ON DOMESTIC SUPPORT and cover note
1. Capping Commitments | 2. Reduction commitments | 3. Product Specific AMS Limits | 4. On Annex 2 (Green Box) | 5. Domestic Support Trigger Mechanism (DSTM) | 6. Consultations | 7 Monitoring | 8. Transparency | 9. Final provisions
ANNEX 1 (calculation of final cap)
ANNEX 2 (AS PER G/AG/W/32/REV.21) (products defined for product-specific limits)
I’ve added notes in blue with orange shading
(23-7406) (24-0297)
Committee on Agriculture
Special Session
TOWARDS A STRENGTHENED NEGOTIATION FRAMEWORK
IN THE DOMESTIC SUPPORT PILLAR
BUILDING A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO
NEGOTIATIONS ON DOMESTIC SUPPORT
Revision
The following communication, dated 1 November 2023, (12 January 2024) is being circulated at the request of the Cairns Group1 (added: and Ukraine).
1 Co-sponsoring Members are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, Peru, Thailand, Uruguay and Viet Nam.
1. The Cairns Group is committed to achieving greater fairness and a levelling of the playing field in agriculture through comprehensive agriculture trade reform in line with Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Such reform is essential for addressing global challenges relating to food security, development and livelihoods, and the environment.
2. Consistent with our view that the pathway with the best prospects for success in agriculture is through a holistic reform process, the Cairns Group believes that JOB/AG/243 circulated by Costa Rica on 9 June 2023, should be the basis of domestic support negotiations. As such, we submit the following revision of Section B of JOB/AG/243 as the basis for a text-based modalities discussion on domestic support and a permanent solution for the issue of public stockholding for food security purposes (PSH).
3. To ensure a robust and significant reform package, further negotiations among WTO Members could expand on the design and implementation of the overall modalities, including on the levels at which certain thresholds and limits are set; scope and product coverage; product aggregation in Annex II in the context of addressing product-specific support concentration issues; the design and application of a domestic support triggering mechanism; and Annex 2 of the AoA.
Commitment from developed Cairns Group countries to pick the lowest final limit produced by the calculations:
4. In line with our commitment to the reform process, the three developed country WTO Members of the Cairns Group (Australia, Canada and New Zealand) commit, at the implementation phase, to schedule their Final Cap for domestic support at the lowest calculated level of either the starting Baseline, the Base Cap or the Final Cap.
5. Since the Agreement on Agriculture is currently subject to negotiations, we reserve the right to submit further revisions to this proposal, including on any additional text that may be required to ensure full legal certainty in the context of final modalities.
6. The Cairns Group remains committed to working on all pillars and with all interested WTO Members to integrate the key elements of different proposals in a way that is balanced, pragmatic, viable and transparent, and which supports continued progress in the negotiations.
DRAFT OF MODALITIES
MINISTERIAL DECISION ON MODALITIES FOR REFORM OF THE
DOMESTIC SUPPORT PILLAR, FEBRUARY 2024
The Ministerial Conference,
Having regard to paragraph 1 of Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization;
Recalling the long-term objective to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system and to provide for substantial progressive reductions in agricultural support and protection sustained over an agreed period of time, resulting in correcting, and preventing restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets as stated in the Preamble of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA);
Having regard that special and differential treatment is an integral part of the agriculture negotiations as stated in the Preamble of the AoA;
Considering the importance of further levelling the playing field for global agricultural trade in order to realize the full potential of the agricultural reform process;
Recognizing the role that a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system plays in supporting progress towards the targets set out under the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, including to end poverty and hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, promote sustainable agriculture and food systems, implement resilient agricultural practices, enhance production, and strengthen the policy response to climate change and natural disasters through both mitigation and adaptation actions;
Taking note of the achievements in the negotiations to date, as well as the need to make further progress in order to fulfil existing mandates relevant to the agriculture negotiations, as set out in Article 20 of the AoA, and the Bali and Nairobi Ministerial Decisions.
Decides as follows:
I. Capping Commitments
The aggregate measurement of support (AMS) remains the method of measuring trade-distorting domestic support, without (in this draft) altering the 1986–88 reference prices. Explained here.
1. Members shall not provide trade-distorting domestic support which taken in aggregate exceeds a monetary limit (hereafter “base cap”) as provided in Column 2 of Annex I of this Decision. This limit shall apply to all of domestic support measures in favour of agricultural producers currently provided under Article 6 of the Agreement on Agriculture, with the exception of domestic measures which are not subject to limitations in terms of the criteria set out in this Decision and in Annex 2 to the Agreement on Agriculture. For the purposes of the Agreement on Agriculture, the final commitment reached under this Decision shall continue to be expressed in terms of Total Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS).
2. The base cap in Paragraph 1 shall be calculated as follows:
The baseline is the sum of all entitlements (de minimis + additional AMS entitlements) plus highest actual support under the “Development Box” (Art.6.2) and the “Blue Box” (Art.6.5). These are explained here. This brings currently unlimited Development and Blue boxes into the entitlement envelope, creating new limits for them as part of the package:
a. A baseline, as provided in Column 1 of Annex I of this Decision, which shall be estimated as the sum of:
i) The monetary value of de minimis entitlements for product-specific support and non-product-specific AMS under Article 6.4, as estimated using the average value of total agricultural production for the last three years available; plus
ii) Final Bound Total AMS as specified in Part IV of the Member’s Schedule; plus
iii) The highest level of support provided under Article 6.2 during the most recent consecutive three years, as notified to the Committee on Agriculture; plus
iv) The highest level of support provided under Article 6.5 during the most recent consecutive three years, as notified to the Committee on Agriculture.
The baseline is then adjusted in some cases, resulting in a “base cap”, the starting point for reducing support. It would be the agreed limit for each country in the first year that this is implemented. This slightly softens the blow of the cuts.
For developing countries if the baseline is above 20% of the value of production, the number is raised to produce a “base cap” of 30% of the value of production.
For all countries, if the baseline is below that 20%, the figure is raised either to 20% of the value of production, or $1bn, whichever is lower in dollars:
b. The baseline shall be adjusted as follows in order to obtain the base cap:
i) Developing Members with a baseline equal or superior to 20%, but lower than 30% of the average total value of agricultural production for the last three years available, shall receive an upward adjustment so that their base cap is equal to 30% of the average total value of agricultural production for the last three years available.
ii) Any Member with a baseline inferior to 20% of the average total value of agricultural production for the last three years available, shall receive an upward adjustment so that their base cap is equal to 20%, or shall receive an additional adjustment of [USD 1 billion], whichever adjustment is lower in monetary terms.
II. Reduction Commitments
Larger subsidisers cut more. Essentially the formula adds up all the “base cap” numbers (adjusted or unadjusted baseline) to arrive at a grand total of calculated support for all WTO members. It then calculates each country’s share of that grand total and produces a new reduced limit for each (the “new cap”). Countries with a bigger share make a bigger cut.
(Mathematically, Ai is a fraction; so (1–Ai) is a smaller number if the country’s share of global support is larger, and therefore the new cap NCi, the product of BCi times a smaller (1–Ai), is lower in comparison to the base cap BCi):
3. Members shall reduce their individual base cap using their relative participation in the total collective base cap. The total collective base cap being the aggregate of all the individual base caps estimated in paragraph 2. For certainty, the following formula shall be used when estimating individual reductions:
NCi= BCi*(1–Ai), where:
NCi is the new cap after reductions for Member “i”;
BCi is the base cap for Member “i”;
Ai is the share of Member “i”, in the total base cap, so Ai=BCi/(∑i=1164BC)
An additional constraint: Total worldwide entitlements to be halved by end-2034 (10 years if implementation starts the year after the 2024 Ministerial Conference). This is why the formula is applied 9 times — to meet this additional constraint:
4. The total collective base cap shall be subject to a reduction of at least [50]% by 31 December 2034.
Formula applied 9 times, explained in the original version of Costa Rica’s paper, from page 6:
5. Members shall reduce their individual base cap in line with the objective set out in paragraph 4, by applying nine times the formula of paragraph 3.
The smallest subsidisers don’t have to make any cuts, with further adjustments allowed to raise the cap for other small subsidisers to $250mn, $500mn or $750mn depending on how low the calculated limit is after cutting (the “new cap”):
6. Where the individual base cap is less than or equal to [USD 1 billion], or the equivalent in the monetary terms in which the binding is expressed, Members shall not be required to undertake any reduction commitment.
7. The new cap, as provided in Column 3 of Annex I to this Decision, shall be adjusted before it becomes the final commitment (final cap), so that any Member with a new cap that is:
a. less than or equal to USD 250 million, can schedule its final commitment to be equal to USD 250 million, or the equivalent in the monetary terms in which the binding is expressed; or
b. more than USD 250 million but less than or equal to USD 500 million, can schedule its final commitment to be equal to USD 500 million, or the equivalent in the monetary terms in which the binding is expressed; or
c. more than USD 500 million but less than or equal to USD 750 million, can schedule its final commitment to be equal to USD 750 million, or the equivalent in the monetary terms in which the binding is expressed.
Exemption for least-developed countries, with provisions for when they graduate from least-developed status:
8. Least Developed Country Members shall be exempted from any capping or reduction commitments.
9. Those Least Developed Country Members that have met the criteria for graduation shall be subject to paragraph 1 of this Decision, 10 years after graduation. At that moment they will be required to schedule their base cap in monetary terms, in Part IV of their Schedules. For greater certainty, the provisions under paragraph 7 of this Decision shall apply in the scheduling of their final commitments.
The cuts are to be made by end-2034 (10 years if implemented from the year after the 2024 Ministerial Conference):
10. All Members, other than least-developed country Members, shall schedule their final commitments (hereafter final cap) as provided in Column 4 of Annex I of this Decision, in monetary terms in Part IV of their Schedules. Final commitments shall enter into force no later than 31 December 2034.
11. Members shall continue to respect the existing limits set out in the Agreement on Agriculture on the provision of domestic support until the new limits set out in this Decision enter into force. Access in advance to the new provisions shall be granted in accordance with the schedule of reductions that each Member established in paragraph 10 of this Decision.
III. Product Specific AMS Limits
Definitions of products and product-specific support:
12. For the purposes of this Decision, a product shall be defined in accordance with the categories established in Annex II of this Decision. The aggregation level for each product shall be reviewed every four years by the Committee of Agriculture. At the request of a Member, if in the course of the review, a tariff subheading concentrates more than 50% of total global exports of a given product for more than three years, a new product category shall be created for that specific tariff subheading.1
1 The WTO Secretariat shall keep track of the information necessary for this purpose. As per Article 18.5, Members agree to consult annually in the Committee on Agriculture with respect to their participation in the normal growth of world trade in agricultural products.
13. Unless specified otherwise, all product-specific domestic support provided by a Member shall be accounted for in its final cap limit as set out in Paragraph 10 of this Decision and shall be aggregated into a Product-Specific Support AMS.2
2 The notifications formats under G/AG/2 shall be reviewed accordingly to improve monitoring of all product-specific support provided under Article 6 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
14. As per Paragraph 13, disciplines on Product-Specific Support AMS shall be defined as follows:
Exemption from any limit or a large entitlement allowed if the product is not exported (see footnote) and if it is a significant import for the country. If a country claims a large entitlement for a product that is not a major import, it must allow duty-free, quota-free imports unless it is least-developed:
a. A Member that does not actively engages in exports3 of a product and:
3 A Member with less than 0.01% of global exports of a product (by volume or value when applicable), or that exports less than USD [one] million annually when value is used for that product, shall not be considered to be an active exporter of said product.
i) imports [50%] or more of its annual consumption of that product, shall not be required to include its product-specific domestic support into that Product-Specific AMS; or
ii) imports more than [20]% but less than [50]% of its annual consumption of that product, shall not be required to include its product-specific domestic support into that Product-Specific AMS if it is lower than USD [1] million. Otherwise, a Product-Specific AMS limit of [75%] [100%] of the VoP of said product shall apply; or
iii) imports less than [20]% of its annual consumption of that product, shall have access to Product-Specific AMS up to [50]% [75]% of the VoP of said product, as long as it establishes or maintains a duty-free tariff quota to a volume of imports equivalent to at least [20]% of its annual consumption of said product.4 The provisions under paragraph 14(b)(i) of this Decision shall apply otherwise.
4 Least Developed Country Members shall be exempted from the duty-free tariff quota requirement.
If the county exports the product, the entitlement is smaller on a sliding scale from proposed figures of 25% down to 10%, depending on the share of global exports. If its share is a 5% or more of global exports the entitlement would be 10% of the value of production, the present “de minimis” entitlement for developing countries:
b. A Member that actively engages in exports of a product and over two consecutive years:
i) holds a share of less than [0.5]% of global exports of said product, shall have access to product-specific AMS up to [25]% of the value of that product’s total value of production; or
ll) holds a share of at least [0.5]% but less than [2]% of global exports of said product, shall have access to product-specific AMS up to [20]% of the value of that product’s total value of production; or
iii) holds a share of at least [2]% but less than [5]% of global exports of said product, shall have access to product-specific AMS up to [15]% of the value of that product’s total value of production; or
iiv) holds a share of 5% or more of global exports of said product, shall have access to product-specific AMS up to 10% of the value of that product’s total value of production.
15. [Product-specific domestic support provided to producers in developing country Members to encourage diversification from growing illicit narcotic crops shall not be included in the limit set out in paragraphs 10 and 13 of this Decision.
16. Non-product specific domestic support in the form of generally available investment or input subsidies provided to low-income or resource-poor producers in developing country Members, shall not be included in the limit set out in paragraph 10 of this Decision as long as it does not exceed USD [5] billion during the relevant year.] [Any excess beyond that amount shall be accounted for in the limit set out in Paragraph 10 of this Decision.]
This is about the “Green Box”, domestic support that does not distort prices and quantities or does so minimally. It’s defined in Annex 2 of the Agriculture Agreement, which also contains a list of programmes covered or potentially covered. As it says, the proposal would require members to review and update the Green Box to minimise any distortion, taking various criteria into account:
IV. On Annex 2
17. The provisions and transparency requirements in Annex 2 of the AoA and the Ministerial Decision of 7 December 2013 on General Services shall be reviewed and updated to ensure that covered subsidies have no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on production. Consideration shall be given to concerns about environment protection and food security5, as well as to rural development and poverty alleviation objectives.
5 As defined by FAO: when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.
This trigger mechanism allows importing countries to raise tariffs temporarily on products receiving more support than 10% of the value of production in the exporting countries (established either through notification or through a legal ruling under WTO dispute settlement), even if the entitlement is not breached. Unlike with countervailing duty for subsidies in general, there is no need to prove that the subsidy has an adverse effect (“injury).
The tariff increase can also be triggered if the subsidising country has missed the notification deadline by two years.
The tariff increase is temporary and cannot be more than 50% above the importing country’s agreed maximum duty for that product (the “bound rate”)
The mechanism is a defence against subsidised competition from imports, but not against competition in third markets:
V. Domestic Support Trigger Mechanism (DSTM)
18. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1(b) of Article II of GATT 1994, any Member may take recourse to a Domestic Support Trigger Mechanism in connection with the importation of an agricultural product if any of the following conditions are met:
a. if in its notifications, as from 20[24], the exporting Member has provided any Product-Specific AMS above 10% of its Value of Production in the previous notified year for that product or group of products; or
b. if in its notification obligations under paragraph 2 of Article 18, the exporting Member has not submitted to the Committee on Agriculture its notification on domestic support 2 years following the notification deadline; or
c. if, pursuant to the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, a determination has been made on the existence of product-specific domestic support beyond 10% of the Value of Production (or a circumvention of the relevant disciplines) by the exporting Member.
19. The DSTM shall only be maintained until the end of the calendar year in which it has been imposed and may only be levied at a level which shall not exceed [50]% of the level of the ordinary customs duty6 in effect in the year in which the action is taken.
6 For purposes of clarity, defined here to mean the bound rate.
20. The DSTM shall only be applied to the imported agricultural products of the same origin and for which the corresponding triggering condition has been met for the calendar year in which the action is taken. Any recourse to the DSTM beyond the calendar year in which the action is initially taken shall require a new a new communication to the Committee on Agriculture on the continued existence of the triggering condition, consistent with the process outlined in paragraph 18 above.
21. The operation of the DSTM shall be carried out in a transparent manner. Any Member taking action under the DSTM shall give notice in writing to the Committee on Agriculture as far in advance as may be practicable and in any event within 10 days of the implementation of such action. A Member taking action under the DSTM shall afford any interested Members the opportunity to consult with it in respect of the conditions of application of such action.
This essentially takes the defensive tariff outside regular WTO rules on safeguards:
22. Where measures are taken in conformity with the provisions above, Members undertake not to have recourse, in respect of such measures, to the provisions of paragraphs 1(a) and 3 of Article XIX of GATT 1994, or paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Agreement on Safeguards.
Obligation to consult when asked:
VI. Consultations
23. Any Member seeking coverage of its support programmes under the provisions contained in this Decision shall ensure that its programmes do not adversely affect the food security of other Members and shall upon request hold consultations with other interested Members on the operation of its support programmes.
The agriculture committee monitors implementation:
VII. Monitoring
24. The Committee on Agriculture shall monitor and review the information submitted under this Decision.
25. Members agree to hold dedicated discussions on an annual basis in the Committee on Agriculture to examine relevant developments in the field of domestic support. This examination process shall provide an opportunity for Members to raise any matter relevant to the domestic support pillar.
26. The dedicated discussions shall be undertaken on the basis of factual information and data compiled by the WTO Secretariat from Members’ notifications, complemented, as appropriate, by relevant information provided by Members to the WTO Secretariat.
27. The Committee on Agriculture shall review the implementation of the disciplines contained in this Decision and its operation every three years, taking into account the Dedicated Discussions and the experience gained up to that time, with the aim of making recommendations in a manner consistent with Article 20 of the AoA.
Requirement to notify:
VIII. Transparency
28 Members shall:
a. Fulfil and continue to fulfil its domestic support notification requirements under the Agreement on Agriculture in accordance with document G/AG/2 of 30 June 1995 and its updates.
b. Notify the Committee on Agriculture of the total value of production and the value of production for each subsidized product. The value of production shall be updated annually on the basis of information provided by Members to the WTO Secretariat. The WTO Secretariat will work with other international organizations in providing technical assistance and support for capacity building to any WTO Member encountering difficulties in estimating their total value of agricultural production.
c. Include in their notifications all programmes covered by the Bali Decision on General Services that are related to land reform and rural livelihood security provided in order to promote rural development and poverty alleviation, such as land rehabilitation, soil conservation and resource management, drought management and flood control, rural employment programmes, issuance of property titles, and farmer settlement programmes.
d. Provide the measure type, name, and description for each measure notified in a complete and comprehensive manner, including, if possible, a URL for the related legislation that allows for the measure or programme and a URL for the data source where outlays are found. All product-specific support provided under Article 6 shall be disaggregated by product and type of programme.
29. Members instruct the WTO Secretariat to assist developing country Members, particularly least developed Members, upon their request, to comply with notification and transparency requirements, including through ad hoc advice, technical assistance, and capacity-building support. The Secretariat shall report on the activities in relation to the assistance provided.
XI. Final provisions
Article 20 of the Agriculture Agreement is about continuing to reform agricultural trade:
30. Pursuant to the preamble and Article 20 of the AoA, this Decision shall not be construed to impede the Uruguay Round agricultural reform programme aimed at correcting and preventing restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets. Members are encouraged to continue their reform process consistent with that objective and, to the extent possible, develop and implement programmes that have the least distorting effects on international agricultural markets.
This would settle the controversy over public stockholding for food security when procurement involves trade-distorting domestic support:
31. As of its adoption, for all intents and purposes this Decision constitutes a Permanent Solution on Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes and replaces the interim solution (WT/MIN(13)/38 – WT/L/913) for Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes adopted in Bali, Indonesia in December 2013, as clarified in the General Council Decision of 27 November 2014 (WT/L/939).
This table demonstrates the results of applying the calculations to each country. Columns 1 and 2 give the starting point (the calculated baseline and any adjustments to arrive at the “base cap”) and the final outcome for each country after further adjustments in column 4. The details of the components of the baseline calculations. IT.9 means after nine iterations of the formula to bring the total of final caps across all members to no more than half the global total of the base cap.
Developing countries such as India, Brazil and Indonesia — along with China — end up with larger entitlements than other developing countries (in dollars) because they have large agricultural sectors. Their present entitlements are generally 10% of the value of production (8.5% for China) and many of them also apply exemptions for development such as input subsidies, which the Cairns Group includes in baseline calculations, as set out in the final table:
ANNEX I
| Member COLUMN | BASELINE IN USD MILLION 1 | BASE CAP 2 | NEW CAP (IT.91) 3 | FINAL CAP 4 |
| China | 263,850 | 264,850 | 50,497 | 50,497 |
| European Union | 131,929 | 131,929 | 43,956 | 43,956 |
| India | 105,641 | 120,816 | 42,822 | 42,822 |
| United States | 55,573 | 56,573 | 31,183 | 31,183 |
| Japan | 46,370 | 46,370 | 27,916 | 27,916 |
| Brazil | 32,069 | 45,637 | 27,657 | 27,657 |
| Indonesia | 26,477 | 34,988 | 23,435 | 23,435 |
| Türkiye | 19,308 | 27,493 | 19,863 | 19,863 |
| Mexico | 23,617 | 23,617 | 17,778 | 17,778 |
| Pakistan | 12,492 | 18,738 | 14,883 | 14,883 |
| Russian Federation | 13,158 | 14,158 | 11,852 | 11,852 |
| Korea, Republic of | 10,279 | 13,525 | 11,407 | 11,407 |
| Viet Nam | 8,393 | 11,952 | 10,270 | 10,270 |
| Thailand | 9,654 | 10,819 | 9,424 | 9,424 |
| Philippines | 6,913 | 9,759 | 8,611 | 8,611 |
| Argentina | 6,576 | 9,751 | 8,605 | 8,605 |
| Canada | 7,985 | 8,985 | 8,003 | 8,003 |
| Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of | 6,628 | 8,246 | 7,413 | 7,413 |
| Nigeria | 5,481 | 8,199 | 7,375 | 7,375 |
| Colombia | 5,407 | 6,876 | 6,288 | 6,288 |
| Egypt | 4,485 | 6,652 | 6,100 | 6,100 |
| Malaysia | 4,447 | 6,449 | 5,929 | 5,929 |
| Australia | 4,860 | 5,860 | 5,428 | 5,428 |
| Switzerland | 5,613 | 5,613 | 5,215 | 5,215 |
| Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of | 4,316 | 5,187 | 4,846 | 4,846 |
| Chile | 3,054 | 4,557 | 4,292 | 4,292 |
| Peru | 3,122 | 4,514 | 4,253 | 4,253 |
| Kenya | 2,967 | 4,450 | 4,197 | 4,197 |
| Ukraine | 3,079 | 4,079 | 3,865 | 3,865 |
| Morocco | 2,770 | 3,705 | 3,528 | 3,528 |
| Ghana | 2,218 | 3,327 | 3,183 | 3,183 |
| Dominican Republic | 2,177 | 3,237 | 3,101 | 3,101 |
| Côte d’Ivoire | 2,080 | 3,120 | 2,994 | 2,994 |
| South Africa | 2,113 | 3,113 | 2,987 | 2,987 |
| Cameroon | 1,895 | 2,842 | 2,737 | 2,737 |
| Chinese Taipei | 1,852 | 2,746 | 2,647 | 2,647 |
| New Zealand | 1,710 | 2,710 | 2,615 | 2,615 |
| Israel | 2,258 | 2,534 | 2,450 | 2,450 |
| Ecuador | 1,687 | 2,531 | 2,447 | 2,447 |
| Norway | 2,354 | 2,354 | 2,281 | 2,281 |
| Paraguay | 1,560 | 2,335 | 2,264 | 2,264 |
| Kazakhstan | 1,638 | 1,927 | 1,878 | 1,878 |
| Bolivia, Plurinational State of | 1,260 | 1,890 | 1,843 | 1,843 |
| Uruguay | 1,242 | 1,861 | 1,815 | 1,815 |
| Guatemala | 1,207 | 1,762 | 1,721 | 1,721 |
| Tunisia | 1,123 | 1,533 | 1,502 | 1,502 |
| Sri Lanka | 1,389 | 1,443 | 1,416 | 1,416 |
| Costa Rica | 948 | 1,398 | 1,372 | 1,372 |
| Cuba | 667 | 1,000 | 987 | 1,000 |
| Congo | 634 | 951 | 939 | 951 |
| Honduras | 629 | 938 | 926 | 938 |
| Papua New Guinea | 619 | 877 | 867 | 877 |
| Zimbabwe | 580 | 871 | 861 | 871 |
| Jordan | 547 | 812 | 803 | 812 |
| Panama | 582 | 777 | 769 | 777 |
| Albania | 350 | 700 | 693 | 750 |
| Tajikistan | 588 | 606 | 601 | 750 |
| Kyrgyz Republic | 298 | 596 | 591 | 750 |
| Nicaragua | 392 | 588 | 583 | 750 |
| El Salvador | 427 | 547 | 543 | 750 |
| Jamaica | 349 | 524 | 520 | 750 |
| Mauritius | 308 | 462 | 459 | 500 |
| Mongolia | 268 | 343 | 341 | 500 |
| Moldova, Republic of | 171 | 306 | 305 | 500 |
| Armenia | 151 | 301 | 300 | 500 |
| North Macedonia | 155 | 272 | 271 | 500 |
| Iceland | 216 | 216 | 215 | 250 |
| United Arab Emirates | 141 | 212 | 211 | 250 |
| Georgia | 85 | 169 | 169 | 250 |
| Guyana | 105 | 158 | 157 | 250 |
| Fiji | 93 | 140 | 140 | 250 |
| Montenegro | 58 | 116 | 116 | 250 |
| Namibia | 82 | 112 | 112 | 250 |
| Belize | 66 | 98 | 98 | 250 |
| Gabon | 65 | 97 | 97 | 250 |
| Eswatini | 64 | 96 | 96 | 250 |
| Botswana | 93 | 93 | 93 | 250 |
| Kuwait, the State of | 56 | 84 | 84 | 250 |
| Oman | 62 | 83 | 83 | 250 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 49 | 73 | 73 | 250 |
| Hong Kong, China | 47 | 71 | 71 | 250 |
| Suriname | 44 | 66 | 65 | 250 |
| Grenada | 42 | 63 | 63 | 250 |
| Cabo Verde | 38 | 57 | 57 | 250 |
| Qatar | 40 | 57 | 57 | 250 |
| Barbados | 30 | 44 | 44 | 250 |
| Brunei Darussalam | 27 | 40 | 40 | 250 |
| Samoa | 24 | 36 | 36 | 250 |
| Singapore | 19 | 28 | 28 | 250 |
| Saint Vincent and the Grenadines | 18 | 27 | 27 | 250 |
| Saint Lucia | 15 | 22 | 22 | 250 |
| Antigua and Barbuda | 9 | 13 | 13 | 250 |
| Tonga | 7 | 11 | 10 | 250 |
| Dominica | 7 | 10 | 10 | 250 |
| Bahrain, Kingdom of | 6 | 9 | 9 | 250 |
| Seychelles | 5 | 5 | 5 | 250 |
| Saint Kitts and Nevis | 2 | 4 | 4 | 250 |
| Maldives | 1 | 1 | 1 | 250 |
| Macao, China | – | – | – | 250 |
| GRAND TOTAL | 876,553.98 | 980,791.58 | 491,811.80 | 499,372.07 |
Note the upward adjustments for the smallest players at the end of the table above, with the final column at $250mn, $500mn or $750mn.
1 For greater certainty, the following formula was used when estimating individual reductions:
NCi= BCi*(1–Ai), where:
NCi is the new cap after reductions for Member “i”;
BCi is the base cap for Member “i”;
Ai is the share of Member “i”, in the total base cap, so Ai=BCi/(∑i=1164BC)
The above formula was applied for nine iterations in order to obtain the results in Column 3.
This defines products for product-specific limits using the 2017 World Customs Organization’s Harmonised System of code numbers:
Annex II (as per G/AG/W/32/Rev.21)
| Product or product groups | Product composition (HS2017) |
|---|---|
| Wheat and wheat flour | 1001 1101 |
| Coarse grains | 1002 1003 1004 1005 1007 1008 |
| Rice | 1006 |
| Oilseeds | 1201 1202 1203 1204 1205 1206 1207 |
| Vegetable oils | 1507 1508 1509 1510 1511 1512 1513 1514 1515 |
| Oilcakes | 2304 2305 2306 |
| Sugar | 1701 |
| Butter and butter oil | 0405 |
| Skim milk powder | 040210 |
| Cheese | 0406 |
| Other milk products (Whole milk powder) | 040221 040229 |
| Bovine meat | 0201 0202 021020 |
| Pig meat | 0203 021011 021012 021019 |
| Poultry meat | 0207 |
| Sheep meat | 0204 |
| Live animals | 01 |
| Eggs | 0407 |
| Wine | 2204 2205 |
| Fruits and Vegetables | 07 08 20 |
| Tobacco | 24 |
| Cotton | 5201 5202 5203 |
This shows the component numbers used to calculate the baseline figures in Annex 1. VoP = value of production; FBTAMS = final bound total AMS (“Amber Box” entitlement); Art.6.2 = “Development Box”. The “boxes” are explained here. The title, “Section C”, is inherited from the original version of the paper and should probably be “Annex 3”:
SECTION C – ADDITIONAL ANALYTICAL TABLES
Table 1: Data on Monetized Entitlements following Annex I of JOB/AG/199
(In USD million)
| MEMBER | AV. VOP1 | SOURCE | DE MINIMIS2 | FBTAMS3 | ART.6.24 | BLUE BOX4 | BASELINE |
| China | 1,517,502.5 | REPORTED | 25,975.4 | – | – | 5,875.0 | 263,850.4 |
| European Union | 436,867.5 | REPORTED | 43,686.7 | 82,669.9 | – | 5,572.5 | 131,929.1 |
| India | 402,719.2 | FAO | 80,543.8 | – | 25,097.5 | – | 105,641.4 |
| United States | 364,696.1 | REPORTED | 36,469.6 | 19,103.3 | – | – | 55,572.9 |
| Japan | 85,113.0 | REPORTED | 8,511.3 | 37,208.3 | – | 650.8 | 46,370.4 |
| Brazil | 152,124.4 | REPORTED | 30,424.9 | 912.1 | 732.3 | – | 32,069.3 |
| Indonesia | 116,625.2 | FAO | 23,325.0 | – | 3,151.6 | – | 26,476.6 |
| Mexico | 52,986.6 | REPORTED | 10,597.3 | 12,385.0 | 634.8 | – | 23,617.2 |
| Türkiye | 91,644.6 | REPORTED | 18,328.9 | – | 978.7 | – | 19,307.6 |
| Russian Federation | 87,582.2 | REPORTED | 8,758.2 | 4,400.0 | – | – | 13,158.2 |
| Pakistan | 62,461.1 | REPORTED | 12,492.2 | – | – | – | 12,492.2 |
| Korea, Republic of | 45,083.7 | REPORTED | 9,016.7 | 1,262.4 | – | – | 10,279.2 |
| Thailand | 36,062.3 | FAO | 7,212.5 | 608.1 | 1,833.4 | – | 9,653.9 |
| Viet Nam | 39,840.0 | REPORTED | 7,968.0 | 170.7 | 254.1 | – | 8,392.8 |
| Canada | 47,777.7 | REPORTED | 4,777.8 | 3,206.9 | – | – | 7,984.7 |
| Philippines | 32,531.3 | FAO | 6,506.3 | – | 407.0 | – | 6,913.2 |
| Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of | 27,487.0 | FAO | 5,497.4 | 1,130.7 | N/A | N/A | 6,628.1 |
| Argentina | 32,502.6 | FAO | 6,500.5 | 75.0 | – | – | 6,575.5 |
| Switzerland | 10,782.4 | REPORTED | 1,078.2 | 4,534.3 | – | – | 5,612.5 |
| Nigeria | 27,330.0 | FAO | 5,466.0 | – | 15.0 | – | 5,480.9 |
| Colombia | 22,919.6 | FAO | 4,583.9 | 344.7 | 478.6 | – | 5,407.3 |
| Bangladesh | 24,825.0 | FAO | 4,965.0 | – | 2.7 | – | 4,967.7 |
| Australia | 45,354.8 | REPORTED | 4,535.5 | 324.7 | – | – | 4,860.2 |
| Egypt | 22,173.4 | FAO | 4,434.7 | – | 50.2 | – | 4,484.8 |
| Malaysia | 21,495.5 | FAO | 4,299.1 | – | 147.6 | – | 4,446.7 |
| Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of | 17,289.7 | REPORTED | 3,457.9 | 858.2 | – | – | 4,316.2 |
| Myanmar | 21,165.0 | RD/AG/74 | 4,233.0 | – | – | – | 4,233.0 |
| Peru | 15,045.5 | FAO | 3,009.1 | – | 112.7 | – | 3,121.8 |
| Ukraine | 29,659.8 | FAO | 2,966.0 | 112.9 | – | – | 3,078.9 |
| Chile | 15,191.4 | REPORTED | 3,038.3 | – | 15.9 | – | 3,054.2 |
| Kenya | 14,833.9 | FAO | 2,966.8 | – | N/A | N/A | 2,966.8 |
| Morocco | 12,351.4 | FAO | 2,470.3 | 72.1 | 228.0 | – | 2,770.4 |
| Norway | 4,129.8 | REPORTED | 413.0 | 1,215.9 | – | 724.9 | 2,353.8 |
| Israel | 8,447.2 | REPORTED | 1,689.4 | 569.0 | – | – | 2,258.4 |
| Ghana | 11,089.2 | FAO | 2,217.8 | – | N/A | N/A | 2,217.8 |
| Dominican Republic | 10,791.1 | FAO | 2,158.2 | – | 18.9 | – | 2,177.1 |
| South Africa | 19,907.7 | FAO | 1,990.8 | 122.5 | – | – | 2,113.2 |
| Côte d’Ivoire | 10,400.1 | FAO | 2,080.0 | – | – | – | 2,080.0 |
| Cambodia | 10,090.7 | FAO | 2,018.1 | – | – | – | 2,018.1 |
| Malawi | 8,899.1 | FAO | 1,779.8 | – | 127.2 | – | 1,907.1 |
| Cameroon | 9,473.2 | FAO | 1,894.6 | – | – | – | 1,894.6 |
| Nepal | 8,982.8 | FAO | 1,796.6 | – | 76.9 | – | 1,873.5 |
| Chinese Taipei | 13,728.5 | FAO | 1,372.9 | 478.8 | – | – | 1,851.7 |
| Mali | 8,439.6 | FAO | 1,687.9 | – | 65.1 | – | 1,753.0 |
| Tanzania | 8,596.4 | FAO | 1,719.3 | – | N/A | N/A | 1,719.3 |
| New Zealand | 15,235.1 | FAO | 1,523.5 | 186.9 | – | – | 1,710.4 |
| Ecuador | 8,435.2 | FAO | 1,687.0 | – | – | – | 1,687.0 |
| Kazakhstan | 9,634.9 | FAO | 1,637.9 | – | N/A | N/A | 1,637.9 |
| Paraguay | 7,783.5 | FAO | 1,556.7 | – | 3.0 | – | 1,559.7 |
| Sri Lanka | 4,810.7 | FAO | 962.1 | – | 427.3 | – | 1,389.4 |
| Niger | 6,486.7 | FAO | 1,297.3 | – | N/A | N/A | 1,297.3 |
| Bolivia, Plurinational State of | 6,301.0 | FAO | 1,260.2 | – | – | – | 1,260.2 |
| Uruguay | 6,203.6 | REPORTED | 1,240.7 | – | 1.6 | – | 1,242.3 |
| Yemen | 6,037.8 | FAO | 1,207.6 | – | N/A | N/A | 1,207.6 |
| Guatemala | 5,874.0 | RD/AG/74 | 1,174.8 | – | 32.5 | – | 1,207.3 |
| Tunisia | 5,110.6 | REPORTED | 1,022.1 | 21.1 | 79.9 | – | 1,123.1 |
| Uganda | 5,240.0 | RD/AG/74 | 1,048.0 | – | – | – | 1,048.0 |
| Costa Rica | 4,659.3 | FAO | 931.9 | 15.9 | – | – | 947.8 |
| Angola | 4,442.9 | FAO | 888.6 | – | N/A | N/A | 888.6 |
| Mozambique | 4,242.9 | FAO | 848.6 | – | N/A | N/A | 848.6 |
| Chad | 4,206.7 | FAO | 841.3 | – | 0.1 | – | 841.5 |
| Zambia | 3,678.1 | FAO | 735.6 | – | 97.2 | – | 832.8 |
| Madagascar | 4,126.4 | FAO | 825.3 | – | 5.6 | – | 830.9 |
| Democratic Republic of the Congo | 4,085.0 | RD/AG/74 | 817.0 | – | N/A | N/A | 817.0 |
| Afghanistan | 3,795.0 | RD/AG/74 | 759.0 | – | – | – | 759.0 |
| Benin | 3,548.4 | FAO | 709.7 | – | N/A | N/A | 709.7 |
| Lao PDR | 3,408.0 | REPORTED | 681.6 | – | 1.8 | – | 683.4 |
| Rwanda | 3,365.9 | FAO | 673.2 | – | N/A | N/A | 673.2 |
| Cuba | 3,334.0 | RD/AG/74 | 666.8 | – | – | – | 666.8 |
| Congo | 3,170.6 | FAO | 634.1 | – | – | – | 634.1 |
| Burkina Faso | 3,149.5 | FAO | 629.9 | – | – | – | 629.9 |
| Honduras | 3,125.8 | FAO | 625.2 | – | 4.1 | – | 629.3 |
| Papua New Guinea | 2,924.0 | RD/AG/74 | 584.8 | 34.2 | – | – | 619.0 |
| Tajikistan | 2,020.0 | FAO | 404.0 | 183.7 | – | – | 587.7 |
| Panama | 2,590.2 | FAO | 518.0 | – | 63.5 | – | 581.5 |
| Zimbabwe | 2,902.4 | FAO | 580.5 | – | N/A | N/A | 580.5 |
| Jordan | 2,705.6 | REPORTED | 541.1 | 1.9 | 3.6 | – | 546.6 |
| Senegal | 2,246.8 | FAO | 449.4 | – | 56.7 | – | 506.1 |
| Burundi | 2,504.2 | FAO | 500.8 | – | – | – | 500.8 |
| El Salvador | 1,822.7 | FAO | 364.5 | – | 62.0 | – | 426.5 |
| Togo | 1,919.0 | FAO | 383.8 | – | 8.6 | – | 392.4 |
| Nicaragua | 1,959.7 | FAO | 391.9 | – | – | – | 391.9 |
| Sierra Leone | 1,752.0 | FAO | 350.4 | – | N/A | N/A | 350.4 |
| Albania | 3,497.8 | REPORTED | 349.8 | – | – | – | 349.8 |
| Jamaica | 1,747.2 | FAO | 349.4 | – | – | – | 349.4 |
| Guinea | 1,560.6 | FAO | 312.1 | – | – | – | 312.1 |
| Haiti | 1,544.0 | RD/AG/74 | 308.8 | – | N/A | N/A | 308.8 |
| Mauritius | 1,539.5 | FAO | 307.9 | – | 0.3 | – | 308.2 |
| Kyrgyz Republic | 2,980.7 | REPORTED | 298.1 | – | – | – | 298.1 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 1,390.2 | FAO | 278.0 | – | N/A | N/A | 278.0 |
| Mongolia | 1,141.8 | FAO | 228.4 | – | 39.7 | – | 268.1 |
| Iceland | 288.6 | FAO | 28.9 | 181.2 | – | 5.5 | 215.6 |
| Moldova, Republic of | 1,529.4 | FAO | 152.9 | 17.8 | – | – | 170.7 |
| North Macedonia | 1,359.8 | REPORTED | 136.0 | 18.6 | – | – | 154.6 |
| Armenia | 1,505.2 | FAO | 150.5 | – | – | – | 150.5 |
| Central African Republic | 741.5 | FAO | 148.3 | – | N/A | N/A | 148.3 |
| United Arab Emirates | 707.0 | RD/AG/74 | 141.4 | – | – | – | 141.4 |
| Mauritania | 642.0 | RD/AG/74 | 128.4 | – | N/A | N/A | 128.4 |
| Guyana | 525.5 | FAO | 105.1 | – | – | – | 105.1 |
| Fiji | 466.4 | FAO | 93.3 | – | – | – | 93.3 |
| Botswana | 52.5 | FAO | 10.5 | – | 82.6 | – | 93.1 |
| Liberia | 436.0 | RD/AG/74 | 87.2 | – | N/A | N/A | 87.2 |
| Georgia | 845.5 | FAO | 84.5 | – | – | – | 84.5 |
| Namibia | 372.9 | FAO | 74.6 | – | 7.7 | – | 82.3 |
| Belize | 328.1 | FAO | 65.6 | – | N/A | N/A | 65.6 |
| Gabon | 323.0 | RD/AG/74 | 64.6 | – | – | – | 64.6 |
| Eswatini | 320.0 | RD/AG/74 | 64.0 | – | N/A | N/A | 64.0 |
| Oman | 276.8 | FAO | 55.4 | – | 6.3 | – | 61.7 |
| Montenegro | 580.2 | REPORTED | 58.0 | 0.4 | – | – | 58.4 |
| Kuwait, the State of | 279.6 | FAO | 55.9 | – | N/A | N/A | 55.9 |
| Trinidad and Tobago | 245.0 | FAO | 49.0 | – | – | – | 49.0 |
| Hong Kong, China | 235.3 | FAO | 47.1 | – | – | – | 47.1 |
| Suriname | 218.4 | FAO | 43.7 | – | N/A | N/A | 43.7 |
| Grenada | 209.3 | FAO | 41.9 | – | N/A | N/A | 41.9 |
| The Gambia | 207.1 | REPORTED | 41.4 | – | – | – | 41.4 |
| Lesotho | 159.0 | RD/AG/74 | 31.8 | – | 8.9 | – | 40.7 |
| Qatar | 189.5 | FAO | 37.9 | – | 2.5 | – | 40.4 |
| Cabo Verde | 189.9 | FAO | 38.0 | – | N/A | N/A | 38.0 |
| Barbados | 146.9 | FAO | 29.4 | – | 1.0 | – | 30.4 |
| Vanuatu | 135.1 | FAO | 27.0 | – | – | – | 27.0 |
| Brunei Darussalam | 133.4 | FAO | 26.7 | – | N/A | N/A | 26.7 |
| Samoa | 118.6 | FAO | 23.7 | – | – | – | 23.7 |
| Solomon Islands | 116.0 | RD/AG/74 | 23.2 | – | N/A | N/A | 23.2 |
| Singapore | 93.8 | FAO | 18.8 | – | – | – | 18.8 |
| Saint Vincent and the Grenadines | 90.5 | FAO | 18.1 | – | – | – | 18.1 |
| Saint Lucia | 74.5 | FAO | 14.9 | – | N/A | N/A | 14.9 |
| Djibouti | 73.0 | RD/AG/74 | 14.6 | – | N/A | N/A | 14.6 |
| Antigua and Barbuda | 43.7 | FAO | 8.7 | – | N/A | N/A | 8.7 |
| Tonga | 35.0 | RD/AG/74 | 7.0 | – | – | – | 7.0 |
| Dominica | 33.0 | RD/AG/74 | 6.6 | – | N/A | N/A | 6.6 |
| Bahrain, Kingdom of | 30.8 | FAO | 6.2 | – | 0.1 | – | 6.2 |
| Seychelles | 17.9 | FAO | 3.6 | – | 1.6 | – | 5.2 |
| Saint Kitts and Nevis | 11.7 | FAO | 2.3 | – | N/A | N/A | 2.3 |
| Maldives | 4.6 | FAO | 0.9 | – | N/A | N/A | 0.9 |
| Macao, China | 2.0 | RD/AG/74 | – | – | – | – | – |
Source: Costa Rica. Based on the following information:
1. Average VoP calculated using reported information as compiled by Canada in JOB/AG/219. When not available, the Value of Production compiled by FAO (October 2022 update) was used. If none of these databases had a reference value, calculations in RD/AG/74 were used. In those cases where RD/AG/74 was used, the estimated VoP will only reflect data for 2016.
2. De Minimis calculations are based on Members’ entitlements in accordance with Article 6.4 of the AoA and any relevant Protocol of Accession. De minimis estimates reflected in this table are without prejudice to the position of Costa Rica on the calculation that any Member may establish for its own de minimis and should be used only as a reference.
3. FBTAMS entitlements in accordance with JOB/AG/219 as of September 2021.
4. Article 6.2 and Article 6.5 expenditure calculated in accordance with JOB/AG/199 and as reflected in JOB/AG/219. The highest value of the last three years notified was chosen when available.
Updates:
January 17, 2024 — minor changes to reflect the revised document JOB/AG/243/Rev.2
January 2, 2024 — adding the link to the group’s analysis of Green Box use
November 5–7 ,2023 — some revisions in the explanations (sorry, it is a complex text!)
Image credits:
Rice fields | Ivan Bandura, Usplash licence
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